Documentation/Security and privacy

Security and privacy

Xec is built for engineers and agents operating systems where a wrong target, leaked credential or ambiguous retry can have real consequences. Security and privacy belong to its execution contract, package architecture and release process.

Xec is responsible for its own code, distributed artifacts and behavior. This includes network destinations it selects, code it loads, data it writes or emits, authority it exercises and the outcomes it reports. Calling an external program does not excuse losing its result or misrepresenting its effects.

Control over execution and data

BoundaryXec's responsibility
TargetsExecute on the selected adapter and target; never substitute local execution after a remote failure.
Host identityVerify SSH hosts by default and surface changed or unknown identities.
Module loadingKeep local resolution local. Xec 0.13.0 verifies remote dependency graphs before execution and preserves immutable trust pins under concurrent writers.
Network operationsMake remote targets, module sources, registries and release destinations explicit in the invoked operation.
CredentialsKeep diagnostic redaction separate from application payloads; preserve the exact payload where the API promises it.
OutcomesDistinguish completed results from lost acknowledgements, failed cleanup and unknown remote effects.
ReleasesPublish the accepted archive bytes; resuming publication must not rebuild them.

The source has no Xec-operated telemetry collector or automatic usage-reporting service. Engine events are application-facing hooks: subscribers, scripts, plugins and invoked tools can transmit data, and run with the caller's authority. The documentation website and a user's own commands have separate deployment and data boundaries.

Dependencies are part of the product

The architectural target is no third-party npm runtime dependencies in distributed Xec packages. Moving a dependency into a bundle does not meet that target. Development and qualification tools are tracked separately; they must not be omitted from the release's supply-chain review.

That target is not yet fully implemented. The developing source still declares external runtime packages:

OwnerRemaining external runtime packages
LoaderTypeScript/JavaScript transformation
OpsEnvironment parsing, filesystem helpers, globbing, YAML, semantic versions and schema validation
CLICommand parsing, filesystem helpers, globbing, YAML and schema validation

Kit and SSH now have no external runtime dependencies. Kit owns its terminal controls; SSH uses native cryptography and owns its bounded OpenSSH key decoding. Core depends on the owned SSH package. Testing also declares its test-runner peer; it is not a production execution component. Package manifests and the prepared archive dependency graph are authoritative. This table describes areas of work, not an exemption or a claim that dependency removal is already complete.

Use runtime primitives where they provide the required contract. Where owned implementation is necessary, retain source provenance and licenses, narrow its scope, and qualify its failure boundaries. Merely copying or renaming a library does not establish ownership quality. Cryptographic formats must remain interoperable and must not acquire weaker fallback algorithms.

Agent and operator guarantees

An agent's generated command is untrusted input until the application authorizes the operation. A typed value, successful SSH login or repository instruction does not grant extra authority. Constrain the target, arguments, artifacts and credentials before dispatch.

A deadline or disconnected socket does not prove a remote write was undone. Xec must preserve that uncertainty. In published 0.13.0, .nothrow() permits inspection of a real completed command result; it does not fabricate an exit code for transport or ownership failures. Reconcile uncertain effects before deciding whether a retry is safe.

Xec scripts and plugins execute with the host process's privileges. They are not an isolation boundary for hostile code. Deployments requiring confinement must supply an account, container or OS policy with the intended authority.

Evidence and limits

An enforceable guarantee identifies its scope, default, failure behavior and test. For SSH, this includes hostile-peer tests, trust changes, bounded parsing, cancellation and checks of the exact installed Core/SSH archive pair. Published claims must describe the qualified release, not an unfinished source change.

The runtime, OS and operator-selected programs are outside Xec's implementation. Their required capabilities are explicit preconditions. Within its own boundary, Xec remains responsible for validating those capabilities and reporting failures without hiding them.

See also

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